Justice Kennedy and the Ideal of Equality by Amar, Akhil Reed
ESSAY: Justice Kennedy and the Ideal of Equality 
 





We can see that content based discriminations--reserving Tuesday for a health care debate and 
Wednesday for a welfare reform debate--is in some contexts more permissible than viewpoint 
based discriminations. We can see that a working democracy requires not merely negative 
protection against state censorship, but also affirmative government action to promote free 
speech--to create the Town Hall or Assembly Room or other Public Forum where the freedom of 
speech can occur. ... Our public forum doctrine ought not to be a jurisprudence of categories 
rather than ideas, or convert what was once an analysis protective of expression into one which 
grants the government authority to restrict speech by fiat . . . .Public spaces and thoroughfares 
that are suitable for discourse may be public forums, whatever their historical pedigree and 
without concern for a precise classification of property. ... It must nurture the public forum. ... 
And this is a public forum about which Justice Kennedy has had a lot to say. ... The principal 
[also] chose the religious participant, here a rabbi [Third, via his guidelines and advice] the 
principal directed and controlled the content of the prayer. ... Even if affirmative action in other 
contexts (like contracting set-asides) is unconstitutional, might education be different, as a 
special public forum, permitting special sensitivity to "marginal voices," to use Justice Kennedy's 
own phrase? ...   
 
TEXT: 
I grew up a few miles down the road from here, and it is good to be back home. By instinct, I am 
a Northern Californian; by training, a constitutional scholar. At times, I have wondered whether 
there is a tension between these two. Massachusetts, it might be said, gave Americans the 
Revolution; Pennsylvania, one could say, gave lovers of liberty the Declaration of Independence 
and the Constitution (not to mention a hall and a bell); Connecticut, according to lore, gave 
students of the Constitution a famous compromise; Virginia and New York gave us state and 
federal Bills of Rights; Illinois gave us Lincoln, and thus Emancipation; Ohio, via John 
Bingham, gave us the Fourteenth Amendment; and in our century, the Deep South gave us both 
Hugo Black and Martin Luther King, Jr. What, it might be asked, has Northern California given 
to our Constitutional Tradition? 
 
One answer--my answer this afternoon--is Justice Anthony Kennedy. This seems an apt venue to 
offer such an answer--in the city where Anthony Kennedy was born, grew up, went to high 
school, practiced law, and first took the bench; and at the law school where he taught for many 
years. And this seems an apt moment to take stock of Justice Kennedy's contributions to our 
Constitutional Tradition, meeting, as we are, in the shadow of the sixtieth anniversary of his birth 
and twentieth anniversary on the bench, and within sight of what will be the tenth anniversary of 
his nomination to the High Court. Thus, the time and the place are right; the stars, it seems, are 
all in line. Let us see where they lead us. 
 
This afternoon, I propose to examine a handful of Justice Kennedy's opinions, handed down at 
various points in his tenure on the Supreme Court. Doctrinally, these cases raise distinct issues; 
but they are, I think, linked together by a certain vision of Justice Kennedy's. It is, for me, an 
attractive and often inspiring vision--a vision of truly equal citizenship in a diverse, pluralistic, 
boisterous, participatory democracy. It is a vision remarkable in both substance and style. 
Substantively, these Kennedy opinions enable us to see many facets of the equality ideal. Indeed, 
I shall suggest that each case can be usefully seen through the lens of a different constitutional 
clause. Sometimes this clause explicitly appears in Justice Kennedy's analysis; other times, his 
imagery and instincts summon it up more subtly, perhaps even subconsciously. Stylistically, 
Justice Kennedy tries to teach us about the Constitution by example. The Constitution is a 
tolerant document enabling diverse folk to live together as democratic equals. And so Justice 
Kennedy's tone is consistently tolerant  [*516]  and measured--he disagrees with his colleagues 
on the bench without being disagreeable. The Constitution proclaims itself in the name of 
ordinary citizens--We the People--and so Justice Kennedy writes clean, straight prose, with as 
little legalese as possible. Remarkably, in none of the opinions I have chosen does a footnote 
clutter the page: the gist of his argument reads well in the New York Times and the Sacramento 
Bee. The Justice is a teacher here; all Americans are his students; and he tries to reach us by 
using words and images we can understand. 1 
 
As I said, it is a remarkable vision, both in style and substance, calling to mind Jimmy Stewart 
and Frank Capra at their best. Let us explore it together. 
 
I. TEXAS V. JOHNSON 
 
Consider first the 1989 case of Texas v. Johnson. 2 During the 1984 Republican National 
Convention in Dallas, Gregory Lee Johnson participated in a political demonstration to protest 
the policies of the Reagan Administration and of some Dallas-based corporations. At the end of 
the demonstration, Johnson unfurled the American flag, doused it with kerosene, and set it on 
fire as the protesters chanted "America, the red, white, and blue, we spit on you." Texas 
criminally prosecuted Johnson for desecrating the flag; Johnson claimed that the First 
Amendment barred such prosecution. The case reached the Supreme Court in 1989--very early in 
Justice Kennedy's tenure on the Court. In fact, he was the most junior Justice in the case. 
 
And also the swing Justice in the case--for his eight senior colleagues split four-to-four on the 
issue. As Kennedy went, so would go the Court. In the end, he went with the First Amendment 
claim, and he explained his reasons in an elegant six-paragraph concurrence. 
 
It is an extraordinarily respectful and deferential concurrence. He begins by praising "the words 
Justice Brennan chooses so well" in the majority opinion, (which he joins); but he also goes out 
of his way to tip his hat to "our colleagues in dissent [who] advance powerful arguments." 3 Both 
of these are generous gestures. Justice Brennan's opinion makes some powerful logical points, 
but the "words he chooses so well" do not really soar or soothe. 4 Conversely, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's dissent bubbles over with emotion and rhetoric, but is rather short on hard logic; 
judged by conventional legal standards of text, structure, doctrine, and logic, "shoddy" might 
 [*517]  be a more accurate description of its arguments than "powerful." 5 But also, a less 
charitable description--and as noted, Justice Kennedy chooses the path of charity. 
 
Justice Kennedy's main audience is not his colleagues but his countrymen. He is aware that many 
ordinary citizens will be "dismayed by our holding"--especially perhaps, veterans "who have had 
the singular honor of carrying the flag in battle." 6 Why, then, does Justice Kennedy in the end 
choose their "dismay"? Not because he respects what Gregory Lee Johnson said and did. On the 
contrary he pointedly distances himself from Johnson. He refers to him only as "this respondent," 
and wonders aloud about whether the respondent even possessed "the ability to comprehend how 
repellent his statements must be to the Republic itself." 7 Rather, Justice Kennedy holds for 
Gregory Lee Johnson because: (1) Justice Kennedy is a judge, and a judge must follow the law, 
even when--especially when--the law protects some-one the judge may not like; and (2) the law 
in question--the Constitution--protected what Johnson did, however loathsome. Ordinary people 
need to understand both points, and so Justice Kennedy tries to explain them in clear prose. 
 
On the first point: 
The hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do not like. We make them because 





On the second point: 
It is poignant but fundamental that the flag protects those who hold it in contempt . . . The fact 
remains that [Johnson's] acts were speech, in both the technical and the fundamental meaning of 




Justice Kennedy's second point merits careful analysis. First, Johnson's antics were "speech," in 
both a "technical" and a "fundamental" sense. The Justice, I submit, is right on both counts, 
synthesizing principled formalism and honest realism. Technically, and fundamentally, Johnson 
spoke: "America, the red, white, and blue, we spit on you." And had he spoken other words, his 
overall performance would not have been flag desecration, but flag respect. Patriots burn flags 
every day--when a flag becomes soiled, one is supposed to burn it. But patriots burn flags with 
respect, speaking words like the pledge of allegiance. And even without the particular words 
 [*518]  spoken by Johnson and his fellow protesters, isn't it true--both technically and 
fundamentally--that Johnson was being punished for the message he communicated? Of course, 
burning is an act--but that doesn't make it nonspeech. A sign language gesture is an act; typing 
an essay is an act; vocalization of words is an act; laser printing is an act--but these are all 
speech, too, both technically and fundamentally. 10 To deny this--as the Johnson dissenters tried 
to do--is gimmicky, even unworthy. 
 
But even if Johnson's antics were "speech," why must they be absolutely protected? This brings 
us to Justice Kennedy's claim that because Johnson's "acts were speech . . . he must go free." In 
formal doctrinal terms--terms that Justice Kennedy avoids, perhaps because they seem a bit too 
sterile for a lay audience in this highly charged case--the Constitution bars "viewpoint 
discrimination," especially viewpoint discrimination aimed at political critics of the government 
or the established order. In Kennedy's more poetic formulation, "the flag protects those who hold 
it in contempt." 
 
"But where does the Constitution say that?" a critic might press. Surely "speech" is not an 
absolute. Surely a person may be criminally punished for uttering the words "your money or 
your life" or "I'll pay you ten thousand dollars if you'll pardon me, governor." Surely a person 
may be sued for an intentionally false statement of fact that destroys another's reputation. Why 
are the words, "America, we spit on you" any different? 
 
Justice Kennedy does not directly engage this critic in his short concurrence; but the Brennan 
opinion he joins makes clear that expressions of opinion are very different from threats or bribes 
or false statements of fact; and that the protection of political opinion--especially anti-
governmental political opinion--lies at the core of the First Amendment. 11 Hence, there is a strict 
ban on governmental discrimination based upon political viewpoint. If it is permissible to say "I 
support government policy" it must be permissible to say "I oppose government policy" or even 
"I despise--I spit on--government policy." 12 Implicit in this ban on viewpoint discrimination is a 
rather powerful ideal of equality of a certain sort--equality of political opinion. And so, because 
the flag protects those who adore it, and so profess, it must "protect those who hold it in 
contempt." 
 
Justice Kennedy points to no specific clause in his six-paragraph concurrence. He speaks of "the 
Constitution" and "the law," and of "the flag" as a metaphor for both. He also speaks of 
"speech"--an obvious allusion to the First Amendment's Freedom of Speech Clause, the 
centerpiece of Justice Brennan's opinion. But the simple word "speech" should also remind us, I 
suggest, of the other free speech  [*519]  clause in the Constitution, the Article I section 6 clause 
protecting freedom of "speech or debate" in Congress. 13 
 
If we think seriously about speech and debate in a well governed legislative assembly--a town 
meeting or a Parliament (literally, a "speaking body," from the French "parler")--we see further 
confirmation of some of Justice Kennedy's insights and instincts. First, and most important, a 
well-running assembly should not discriminate on the basis of political viewpoint. If A can take 
the floor to support the war, B must be free to take the floor to oppose it. Speech may be limited: 
five minutes per person. But the freedom of speech--understood here as a protection against 
viewpoint discrimination--is an absolute. And the First Amendment can be understood as 
extending this absolute freedom beyond the legislative assembly hall itself to the people "out of 
doors"--the ultimate National Assembly. (This, in a nutshell, is the insight of the great speech 
theorist, Alexander Meiklejohn. n14) 
 
The image of freedom of speech in a well run assembly also helps illuminate other aspects of our 
First Amendmet Tradition. Through it, we can see that political speech--the stuff of legislative 
speech and debate--is structurally and historically central, deserving priority of place over, say, 
commercial advertising. We can see that content based discriminations--reserving Tuesday for a 
health care debate and Wednesday for a welfare reform debate--is in some contexts more 
permissible than viewpoint based discriminations. We can see that a working democracy requires 
not merely negative protection against state censorship, but also affirmative government action 
to promote free speech--to create the Town Hall or Assembly Room or other Public Forum 
where the freedom of speech can occur. Finally, the assembly model reminds us of another 
equality principle: speech rights should not simply track property or wealth distributions. Even if 
Ross Perot and Steve Forbes own more than the rest of us put together, they are not entitled to 
speak at the town meeting longer than the rest of us put together. Speech time in our assembly 
hall should be distributed more equally--a poor man should get his turn at the microphone, too, 
as Norman Rockwell so beautifully reminds us. "Speech" is not merely property; it is democracy, 
too--and thus it must be allocated with an eye towards equality. 
 
These last points, I suggest, were at the heart of Justice Kennedy's message in his 1992 
concurrence in International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee. 15 Let us now turn to that 
case. 
 
 [*520]  II. INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS V. LEE 
 
In the 1992 Krishna case, the major New York City airports banned both the solicitation of funds 
and the distribution or sale of leaflets inside the terminals. Four Justices voted to uphold both 
bans; three other Justices voted to strike down both bans. In the middle sat Justices O'Connor and 
Kennedy, who thought that the ban on solicitation could stand, and that the ban on leafleting 
must fall. Although they reached this result by different paths, together these two Justices cast 
the decisive votes, siding with the four to uphold the solicitation ban, and with the three to strike 
down the leafleting ban. Once again, we see Justice Kennedy in the center; as he (and in this case 
Justice O'Connor) went, so went the Court. 
 
For our purposes here, Justice Kennedy's opinion contains several noteworthy moves. First, he 
insists that judges should not be stingy in recognizing special "public fora" where vigorous free 
speech receives special judicial protection. A couple of years before Krishna, Justice Kennedy 
put the point as follows: "As society becomes more insular in character, it becomes essential to 
protect public places where traditional modes of speech and forms of expression can take place." 
16 In Krishna, he pleads with his colleagues not to adopt a rigid historical test that would deny 
"public forum" status to new venues simply because these places were not historically or 
traditionally viewed as such: 
Our public forum doctrine ought not to be a jurisprudence of categories rather than ideas, or 
convert what was once an analysis protective of expression into one which grants the 
government authority to restrict speech by fiat . . . . 
Public spaces and thoroughfares that are suitable for discourse may be public forums, whatever 




Once again, we see a beautiful synthesis of principled legalism and honest realism. Justice 
Kennedy is not making up new constitutional principles, but trying to apply old ones to new 
contexts. 18 The deep principles of freedom of the press must apply not merely to printing presses, 
but to airwaves and cyberspace. The Fourth Amendment must protect our papers, but also our 
floppy disks; it must limit physical government trespass upon our homes, but also high-tech 
wiretaps. Traditional, historical public fora may be withering away, Justice Kennedy warns, and 
so judges must be vigilant to protect new fora, like airports: 
 [*521]  Without this recognition our forum doctrine retains no relevance in times of fast-
changing technology and increasing insularity. In a country where most citizens travel by 
automobile, and parks all too often become locales for crime rather than social intercourse, our 
failure to recognize the possibility that new types of government property may be appropriate 
forums for speech will lead to a serious curtailment of our expressive activity. 
 





Finally, let us note a trio of passages in which Justice Kennedy offers up his substantive vision of 
the freedom of speech: 
The liberties protected by our doctrine derive from the Assembly, as well as the Speech and 
Press Clauses of the First Amendment, and are essential to a functioning democracy. See Kalven, 
The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 14, 19. Public places are 
of necessity the locus for discussion of public issues, as well as protest against arbitrary 
government action. At the heart of our jurisprudence lies the principle that in a free nation 
citizens must have the right to gather and speak with other persons in public places. The 
recognition that certain government-owned property is a public forum provides open notice to 
citizens that their freedoms may be exercised there without fear of a censorial government, 
adding tangible reinforcement to the idea that we are a free people. 
 
. . . . 
 
The danger of allowing the government to suppress speech is shown in the case now before us. A 
grant of plenary power allows the government to tilt the dialogue heard by the public, to exclude 
many, more marginal voices. . . . We have long recognized that the right to distribute flyers and 
literature lies at the heart of the liberties guaranteed by the Speech and Press Clauses of the First 
Amendment. 
 
. . . . 
 
". . . It should be remembered that the pamphlets of Thomas Paine were not distributed free of 
charge." The effect of a rule of law distinguishing between sales and distribution would be to 
close the marketplace of ideas to less affluent organizations and speakers, leaving speech as the 
preserve of those who are able to fund themselves. One of the primary purposes of the  [*522]  
public forum is to provide persons who lack access to more sophisticated media the opportunity 





Several points deserve emphasis here. First, we see again an effort to harmonize formal legal 
theory with flesh-and-blood, embodied reality. In Johnson, Justice Kennedy paid tribute to 
ordinary citizens who "had the singular honor of carrying our flag in battle," and here he again 
summons up a vision of ordinary citizens in action. These men and women need real freedom of 
speech, not merely formal freedom of speech. This is what the Justice means when he speaks of 
"tangible reinforcement to the idea that we are a free people." 21 And he shows particular concern 
for poor folks' speech--for "marginal voices" and "the very persons who need [speech protection] 
most." A strict formalist might see a total ban on airport leaflets as viewpoint neutral--formally 
applying to liberals and conservatives, establishment and nonestablishment, rich and poor alike. 
But Justice Kennedy sees that this formal neutrality masks a real-life skew--the "effect" of the 
rule is to selectively "close the marketplace of ideas," to "tilt the dialogue." 22 
 
If, in Johnson, Justice Kennedy's rhetoric wafted in the direction of Alexander Meiklejohn, here 
he is much more explicit. He invokes the Assembly Clause, alongside the Speech and Press 
Clauses, vividly bringing to mind the image of a democratic assembly. He reminds us that the 
First Amendment is "essential to a functioning democracy." 23 He pointedly cites Meiklejohn's 
ally and co-theorist, Harry Kalven. He accentuates the public aspects of speech--in "public 
places" on "public issues." And the entire structure of his analysis reminds us that government's 
role is not merely negative, but affirmative. Government must not censor, but it must do more 
than this. It must nurture the public forum. As Meiklejohn reminds us, government may not 
abridge the freedom of speech, but it may and must promote it. 24 
 
If we seek a clause beyond the First Amendment to further support this vision, I nominate the 
Article IV, section 4 Republican Government Clause: "The United States shall guarantee to 
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government." 25 In its essence this clause is about 
democratic equality and self-government 26 --reminding us that, in Kennedy's grand phrase, "we 
are a free people." The clause goes beyond formal viewpoint neutrality to address the real need 
for robust political participation of all elements of the republic. The clause is not merely  [*523]  
negative but affirmative: Congress must affirmatively guarantee the conditions of a free 
republic. And the clause, of course, highlights the centrality of the res publica--the public thing. 
This, in the end, is exactly what Meiklejohn, Kalven, and Kennedy mean to conjure up with 
images like town meetings, public spaces and public fora--places where we the people do our 
public "thing" of republican self-government through the give and take of public discourse. 
 
Another place where the people do this thing is the jury box. And this is a public forum about 
which Justice Kennedy has had a lot to say. Let us now turn to the jury. 
 
III. POWERS V. OHIO AND EDMONSON V. LEESVILLE CONCRETE CO. 
 
In Powers v. Ohio, 27 an Ohio prosecutor used peremptory challenges to keep seven blacks off the 
jury in a murder trial. The defendant, a white man, objected, claiming that the prosecutor was 
excluding those would-be jurors because they were black. The trial court held that even so, it 
didn't matter; in a trial of a white, a prosecutor could indeed intentionally exclude black jurors. In 
1991, the Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy. Here are his inspiring 
opening words: "Jury service is an exercise of responsible citizenship by all members of the 
community, including those who otherwise might not have the opportunity to contribute to our 
civic life." 28 
 
Once again, we hear an ode to ordinary citizens in a participatory democracy. In Johnson we 
caught a glimpse of citizens who had "the singular honor of" serving their country in war; and 
here we envision ordinary citizens serving their country in peace through "an exercise of 
responsible citizenship"--what the Justice refers to later in Powers as the "honor and privilege of 
jury duty." 29 In Krishna we saw a vision of face-to-face "discussion of public issues" by ordinary 
citizens who "lack access to more sophisticated media;" and here we see a similar effort to 
include "those who otherwise might not have the opportunity to contribute to our civic life." 
 
For Justice Kennedy, the key to the case is that--whatever exclusion does to defendants--it 
violates the right to democratic participation of the excluded jurors: 
The opportunity for ordinary citizens to participate in the administration of justice has long been 
recognized as one of the principal justifications for retaining the jury system . . . . [As 
Tocqueville remarked:] "I do not know  [*524]  whether the jury is useful to those who are in 
litigation; but I am certain it is highly beneficial to those who decide the litigation; and I look 
upon it as one of the most efficacious means for the education of the people which society can 
employ." 
 
Jury service preserves the democratic element of the law, as it guards the rights of the parties and 
ensures continued acceptance of the laws by all of the people. 30 
 
Justice Kennedy then goes one step further, linking jury service with voting: 
 
With the exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most 
significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process . . . . "Whether jury service be 
deemed a right, a privilege, or a duty, the State may no more extend it to some citizens and deny 
it to others on racial grounds than it may invidiously discriminate in the offering and withholding 




Justice Kennedy's explicit textual basis in Powers is the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment; but his instinct that jury service is closely allied with democracy, 
political participation, and voting rights reminds us of the obvious relevance of the Fifteenth 
Amendment. 32 That Amendment, of course, explicitly bars government from depriving a person 
of the vote because of his race. 33 Technically and fundamentally, this command is violated by 
race discrimination in jury selection. Jurors vote--that is what they do--and typically, ordinary 
voters have been eligible to serve as jurors, as Justice Kennedy notes. 
 
This insight helps explain the result and reasoning in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 34 
handed down by the Court a couple of months after Powers. In Edmonson, a private litigant had 
used peremptory challenges to keep two blacks off a civil jury; and the Court, per Justice 
Kennedy, struck down this allegedly race-based denial of "the honor and privilege of 
participating in our system of justice." 35  [*525]  The dissenters in Edmonson claimed that the 
discrimination was mere private prejudice, rather than state action regulated by the Constitution. 
36 But Justice Kennedy understood that the jury is inherently a public body. "Though the motive 
of a peremptory challenge may be to protect a private interest, the objective of jury selection 
proceedings is to determine representation on a governmental body . . . ." 37 
 
Surely the state could not empower private "registrars" to deny blacks the right to vote in 
ordinary elections. And, once we see that voting for legislatures and voting on juries are 
intimately linked--as Justice Kennedy teaches us in Powers--we can see that "private" race-based 
peremptories must also fall. To hammer this point home in Edmonson, Justice Kennedy 
prominently relies on the White Primary Cases--involving voting--to invalidate the peremptory 
challenge at hand. 38 
 
If we take seriously this democratic, participatory vision of jury service linked arm-in-arm with 
voting, it argues strongly for the abolition of peremptory challenges altogether, even when these 
challenges are not based on race. We don't allow "registrars" to refuse to let some eligible voters 
vote; why should we allow litigants to exclude those voters from their other democratic "honor 
and privilege," during which they learn to become better citizens? Though Justice Kennedy has 
not yet gone this far, this is, I hope, where his vision might ultimately lead. 39 No willing citizen 
should be peremptorily excluded from the jury box. 
 
Or from her high school graduation, as our next case makes clear. 
 
IV. LEE V. WEISMAN 
 
The principal of a public school in Providence, Rhode Island invited a rabbi to deliver prayers at 
the school's graduation ceremony. The principal gave the rabbi a pamphlet setting out suggested 
"guidelines" for the prayer, and advised the rabbi to offer a "nonsectarian" invocation and 
benediction. As delivered, the prayers made no explicit reference to "the Bible" or "the God of 
Israel;" but they did use some scriptural language--from Micah 6:8, for example. Graduating 
student Deborah Weisman and her father objected to the graduation prayers on Establishment 
Clause grounds; and in 1992, the Supreme Court agreed with the Weismans, by a narrow five-to-
four vote. 
 
 [*526]  Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court. (Once again, we see the Justice as a swing vote; as 
he went, so went the Court.) To a remarkable extent, his opinion avoids sterile legalese. Thus, in 
his opening paragraph in Lee v. Weisman, he explains to lay folk that the Fourteenth Amendment 
makes the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment "applicable with full force to the States and 
their school districts." 40 A Justice less sensitive to the fact that many ordinary Americans are 
listening in to this debate would probably have used the more technical--but less inclusionary--
legal shorthand of "incorporation." In a similar vein, a less populist Justice might have processed 
the entire case through the formulaic three-prong Lemon test, 41 but Justice Kennedy instead 
explains his result to ordinary citizens more directly: 
These dominant facts mark and control the confines of our decision: State officials direct the 
performance of a formal religious exercise at promotional and graduation ceremonies for 
secondary schools. Even for those students who object to the religious exercise, their attendance 
and participation in the state-sponsored religious activity are in a fair and real sense obligatory, 




Justice Kennedy then proceeds to unpack these points in language noteworthy for its candor, its 
common sense, and its grasp of principle. To explain his first point--that "state officials direct the 
performance of a formal religious exercise," Justice Kennedy notes the following facts: 
A school official, the principal, decided that an invocation and a benediction should be given; 
this is attributable to the state, and from a constitutional perspective it is as if a state statute 
decreed that prayers must occur. The principal [also] chose the religious participant, here a rabbi 





To explain his second point--that attendance and participation in this state-run religious 
ceremony were "in a fair and real sense obligatory," Justice Kennedy reminds us of some basic 
facts. Attendance at graduation is not formally required, but who would want to miss it? This is 
an event to bring us all together, not to separate and divide us by creating insiders and outsiders: 
 [*527]  Graduation is a time for family and those closest to the student to celebrate success and 
express mutual wishes of gratitude and respect, all to the end of impressing upon the young 
person the role that it is his or her right and duty to assume in the community and all of its 
diverse parts. 44 
 
 
And so, in response to the government's claim that no coercion exists in Providence, because 
Deborah and her father were formally free to opt out, Justice Kennedy politely but firmly says, in 
effect, "get real": "Law reaches past formalism. And to say a teenage student has a real chance 
not to attend her high school graduation is formalistic in the extreme . . . Everyone knows that in 
our society and in our culture high school graduation is one of life's most significant occasions." 
45 
 
But even if attendance is in a real sense obligatory, is participation in the state-run religious 
event required? Why can't Deborah simply stand aside during opening and closing prayers? 
Because of the whole choreography and atmosphere of the event, Justice Kennedy reminds us. 
Graduation is a time for all to come together; and given the reality of peer pressure in high 
school, it is not fair to force some to stand apart--and thus stand out--on a day when all should 
stand together: 
The undeniable fact is that the school district's supervision and control of a high school 
graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students . . . . 
This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion. 
 
. . . Research in psychology supports the common assumption that adolescents are often 
susceptible to pressure from their peers towards conformity, and that the influence is strongest in 




The dissenters mocked Justice Kennedy's analysis here; but for me at least, Justice Kennedy 
better describes the reality of high school and graduation ceremonies--and better grasps the true 
constitutional principle at the heart of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. That 
principle, it must be stressed, is deeply respectful of religion, not indifferent or hostile to it. 
Precisely because religion is so important, government must keep its hands off. In Kennedy's 
words, trying to explain the Constitution to ordinary Americans (most of whom are religious): 
"The First Amendment's Religious Clauses mean that religious beliefs and religious  [*528]  
expression are too precious to be either proscribed or prescribed by the State." 47 Do we really 
want government bureaucrats in the prayer-writing business?, Justice Kennedy is asking. Won't 
this lead to watered-down civil religion--nonsectarian mush--that may in the end hurt true faith? 
Madison thought so, Kennedy reminds his readers. 48 In the Justice's own words, "while concern 
must be given to define the protection granted to an objector or a dissenting nonbeliever, these 
same Clauses exist to protect religion from government interference." 49 Thus, he closes his 
Weisman opinion by making clear that "we express no hostility to [religion] nor would our oath 
permit us to do so. A relentless and all-pervasive attempt to exclude religion from every aspect 
of public life could itself be inconsistent with the Constitution." 50 
 
This, in fact, was Justice Kennedy's message in the more recent Rosenberger case, where, 
speaking for five Justices, he invalidated a state university policy that discriminated against 
religious speakers. 51 Taken together, Weisman and Rosenberger again remind us of the middle 
course Justice Kennedy has steered. Only he and Justice O'Connor were in both majorities. 
 
Taken as a whole, Kennedy's vision of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses--and of the 
Speech Clause, too, in Rosenberger--places powerful limits on the government's ability to create 
a favored religious caste--a hierarchical scheme of insiders and outsiders. In Justice Kennedy's 
vision, no citizen should be excluded from equal citizenship and respect simply because of who 
he is, or what he believes or feels. And this, I suggest, was also his basic message in our final 
case, Romer v. Evans. 52 
 
V. ROMER V. EVANS 
 
In 1992, the Colorado electorate passed a statewide referendum known as Amendment 2. In 
relevant part, it proclaimed that no state (or city or county) agency should treat "homosexual, 
lesbian, or bisexual orientation" as a basis for heightened anti-discrimination protection. Earlier 
this year, the Supreme Court struck down this referendum by a six-to-three vote. Justice 
Kennedy wrote for the majority. 
 
Supporters of Amendment 2 portrayed it as affirming equal rights for all and simply denying 
special rights to gays. But Justice Kennedy saw that--both formally  [*529]  and realistically--the 
Amendment targeted queers for specially disfavored treatment and heaped unique disabilities on 
them. Heterosexuals could get laws protecting themselves from being discriminated against on 
the basis of their sexual orientation; but gays and bisexuals could not seek symmetric laws. 
Under Amendment 2, Aspen could pass an ordinance preventing a gay apartment complex owner 
from posting a "For Rent--No Straights" sign; but Aspen could not likewise prevent a straight 
apartment complex owner from posting a "For Rent--No Queers" sign. Indeed, in its larger social 
meaning Amendment 2 itself was a kind of "No Queers" sign writ large--a targeting of gays, 
lesbians, and bisexuals, singling them and them alone out for disfavored treatment. 
 
Once again, Justice Kennedy writes an opinion that tries to keep formulaic jargon about tiers of 
scrutiny and so forth down to a minimum. Instead, in everyday words that are at once plain and 
poetic, he explains to decent, fair-minded, ordinary citizens what is wrong with Colorado's 
referendum. In a nutshell, Amendment 2 creates outcasts and outsiders--a group of second-class 
citizens subject to special disfavor and humiliation simply because of their status. Sexual 
orientation--as distinct from sexual conduct--implicates fantasies, desires, thoughts and the like 
that should not be made the basis of legal penalty. Amendment 2 wrongly singles some persons 
out and makes them pariahs because of who they are rather than because of anything they do. In 
this respect, Amendment 2's efforts to treat gays as unclean and untouchable resemble Jim Crow-
-a legal regime classifying and degrading a class of persons because of their status. 
 
Here are Justice Kennedy's opening words: "One century ago, the first Justice Harlan 
admonished this Court that the Constitution 'neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.'" 
53 And here are his closing words: 
It is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort . . . . Laws singling out a 
certain class of citizens for disfavored legal status or general hardships are rare . . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
. . . Laws of this kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed 
is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected [--born of] "a bare . . . desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group." 
 
. . . [Amendment 2] is a status-based enactment[,] a classification of persons undertaken for its 
own sake . . . . "Class legislation . . . [is] obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment" 
 
 [*530]  We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper 
legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State 




I have elsewhere discussed Romer at length, 55 and so here I shall be brief. As with the other 
Kennedy opinions we have discussed, Romer exemplifies an elegant blending of legal formalism 
and legal realism at their best: The Justice sees both the technical and the real-life inequality in 
Amendment 2. Everyone else in the world, from heterosexuals to hot dog vendors to fat people, 
can seek special anti-discrimination laws, but gays and bisexuals--who, the Justice realistically 
notes, may need these laws most 56 --cannot. Laws singling persons out--because of who they are-
-for disfavored treatment are in tension with our constitutional tradition, and should be strongly 
disfavored. 
 
But what about a law singling persons out for inclusion rather than exclusion? This seems rather 
different, perhaps. And although Justice Kennedy placed his primary emphasis on the Equal 
Protection Clause, at one key point in his argument he waved in the direction of another 
provision: the Bill of Attainder Clause. 57 Under this clause, a law singling out, say, Jagdish 
Chadha for deportation would be unconstitutional (as Justice Powell noted in the famous Chadha 
case); 58 but a law singling out Jagdish Chadha for special inclusion--a private immigration bill--
would not. At some point, if special favors created a truly privileged upper caste, the deep 
equality principles of the Title of Nobility Clause might be violated; 59 but not every specially 
targeted benefit creates such an upper caste. 
 
 [*531]  Consider, for example, the vexed question whether public universities should ever give a 
special "plus" to underrepresented racial minorities. Should this use of race to include those who 
have been historically excluded or underrepresented be constitutionally permissible? If the 
Attainder and Nobility Clauses were the only texts at stake, it would be hard to see university 
diversity programs as unconstitutional--surely, blacks in America are not an aristocracy even if 
they do benefit from affirmative action. 
 
But what about the Equal Protection Clause itself? Under it, is all diversity-based affirmative 
action in public universities unconstitutional? Must Bakke 60 be overruled? Justice Kennedy has 
not yet faced these questions, but he may soon. In a brief postscript, let me think aloud with you 
about the dilemma Bakke may pose for Justice Kennedy. 
 
VI. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA V. BAKKE 
 
In the past, Justice Kennedy has been a strong believer in the principle of colorblindness: 61 
Government should not judge a person by his race, or take race into account in allocating 
benefits and burdens. In Romer, as we saw, the Justice began by invoking Justice Harlan's 
famous dissent in Plessy, which proclaimed the colorblind principle. In Powers, Justice Kennedy 
championed color-blindness in two ways: by preventing prosecutors from taking into account a 
juror's race; and by making clear that, when blacks are excluded from juries, a white defendant 
has just as much of a right to object as would a black defendant. So too, in Edmonson, the Justice 
spoke of "the racial insult inherent in judging a citizen by the color of his or her skin." 62 
 
But not all uses of race are or should be unconstitutional. The Equal Protection Clause nowhere 
prohibits all color consciousness. The Congresses that passed the Reconstruction Amendments 
apparently passed race-conscious laws to help the newly freed slaves. 63 Judges can use race in 
remedial contexts--for example, to integrate high schools. 64 Why should public universities be 
barred from using race to bring us together? On this view, using race to separate, or stigmatize, 
or degrade, or divide is quite different from using race to integrate, to unite. 
 
 [*532]  Justice Kennedy's jury and public forum cases envision places where diverse people 
come together to democratically discuss and deliberate. And this is the democratic mission of the 
public university--to bring all Americans together to a place where they will talk to and learn 
from each other face-to-face as democratic equals. 65 No special affirmative action may be 
necessary to generate diverse jury panels--the lottery wheel, combined with Powers' limits on 
peremptories, will guarantee diversity within the jury; but without some affirmative action, some 
historically excluded racial groups may be all but absent in public universities. As in Krishna, 
here too the "dialogue" may be "tilted" in "effect," and perhaps government may go beyond 
formal equality to ensure that Americans, at a formative point in their lives, are exposed to those 
who have lived in different neighborhoods, and have had very different lived racial and cultural 
experiences. Even if affirmative action in other contexts (like contracting set-asides) is 
unconstitutional, might education be different, as a special public forum, permitting special 
sensitivity to "marginal voices," to use Justice Kennedy's own phrase? 
 
Justice Powell thought so in Bakke. 66 What will Justice Kennedy--who now sits in Powell's seat--
think about Bakke, when the issue reaches him? Here too, Justice Kennedy may well be a swing 
voter. Will he adhere to the formal principle of color blindness? Or will he decide that, here too, 
perhaps the law may "reach[] past formalism"? What will the great Justice from Northern 
California say, in the end, about the great case from Northern California, Regents v. Bakke? 
Much of the tale of Northern California and the Constitution, it seems, has yet to unfold. 
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